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14. ABSTRACT Operational protection, one of six operational functions that support the successful employment of combat forces, is one of the foremost responsibilities of an operational commander. In every military operation, operational commanders and staffs will be required to plan and implement operational protection measures, the process of which should include risk management procedures, to ensure the accomplishment of their objectives. Consisting of multiple elements, each component of operational protection must be synchronized with the other components to achieve a synergistic effect that creates an operational advantage by the protection of the friendly center of gravity. While elements of the concept of operational protection exist in joint publications, this operational function has yet to be fully developed. The components of operational protection that are strewn throughout various joint publications need to be synthesized into coherent guidance for the operational commander. The lack of clear and coherent doctrine in joint publications concerning operational protection leads to a deficiency in incorporating risk management procedures for an operational commander's consideration in operational design. An operational commander's clear understanding of what an acceptable level of risk is when determining his forces' operational protection posture significantly contributes to his ability to exercise operational art and achieve decisive results. This paper identifies the missing pieces of the puzzle concerning operational protection in joint doctrine and makes the following recommendations: joint doctrine needs to consolidate and define in a coherent manner the operational function of protection and codify it in a JP 3-X series manual; risk management, and its process, must be identified in joint doctrine as an essential element of operational protection; an Operational Protection Cell should be incorporated into joint doctrine; and an operational protection process, to include risk management procedures, must be defined and integrated into the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).					
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OPERATIONAL PROTECTION:
PIECING TOGETHER THE PUZZLE IN JOINT DOCTRINE

By
Robert W. Lyons
Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

09 February 2004

Faculty Advisor
Professor Pat Sweeney
JMO Professor

ABSTRACT

Operational protection, one of six operational functions that support the successful employment of combat forces, is one of the foremost responsibilities of an operational commander. In every military operation, operational commanders and staffs will be required to plan and implement operational protection measures, the process of which should include risk management procedures, to ensure the accomplishment of their objectives. Consisting of multiple elements, each component of operational protection must be synchronized with the other components to achieve a synergistic effect that creates an operational advantage by the protection of the friendly center of gravity. While elements of the concept of operational protection exist in joint publications, this operational function has yet to be fully developed. The components of operational protection that are strewn throughout various joint publications need to be synthesized into coherent guidance for the operational commander. The lack of clear and coherent doctrine in joint publications concerning operational protection leads to a deficiency in incorporating risk management procedures for an operational commander's consideration in operational design. An operational commander's clear understanding of what an acceptable level of risk is when determining his forces' operational protection posture significantly contributes to his ability to exercise operational art and achieve decisive results.

This paper identifies the missing pieces of the puzzle concerning operational protection in joint doctrine and makes the following recommendations: joint doctrine needs to consolidate and define in a coherent manner the operational function of protection and codify it in a JP 3-X series manual; risk management, and its process, must be identified in joint doctrine as an essential element of operational protection; an Operational Protection Cell should be incorporated into joint doctrine; and an operational protection process must be defined and integrated into the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

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Introduction

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), just weeks before coalition forces attacked into Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power, two American civilian contractors traveling in an automobile were shot just outside the Coalition Force Land Component Commander's (CFLCC) headquarters at Camp Doha, Kuwait – one died and the other sustained serious wounds.¹ Also, after months of deploying United States and coalition military forces to Kuwait and establishing the theater's protective architecture, on 20 March 2003 a CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise missile impacted only 600 yards from Camp Commando, the headquarters for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).² A week later, another Seersucker cruise missile skimmed across the water along the seam of the boundary between the CFLCC and the Coalition Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) areas of operation and detonated on a seawall next to a shopping mall in Kuwait City.³ Because the missiles narrowly missed their targets, the potential negative consequences on the operation are mere speculation; however, these incidents indicate that there are potential seams in operational protection that may be exploited by adversaries. These seams can be traced to gaps in joint doctrine.

In recent years, force protection⁴ has received, and continues to receive, substantial attention within the Department of Defense (DoD).⁵ Following the terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996, which left nineteen U.S. airmen dead and hundreds wounded, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated that the attack should be viewed as, “. . . a watershed event pointing the way to a radically new mindset and dramatic changes in the way we protect our forces deployed overseas from this growing threat.”⁶ Indeed, this event led to the appointment of the Downing Commission, a panel tasked by the Secretary of Defense to assess the facts and circumstances surrounding the

Khobar Towers incident and make recommendations on how to prevent this type of incident from happening again.⁷ This event also led former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, to call on the U.S. military to make force protection a top priority.⁸

However, for all the attention given, most of the material published on protection is focused on the tactical-level and deals with force protection or antiterrorism, which are only elements of operational protection. While it's a major component of operational protection, force protection does not cover the range of activities and measures that an operational commander must employ to ensure the preservation of his combat power for decisive actions.⁹ The increased focus on force protection has also resulted in a significant investment on emerging force protection technologies.¹⁰ Although technological advances are helpful, *Joint Vision 2020* correctly asserts that to achieve full dimensional protection, “. . . material superiority alone is not sufficient. Of greater importance is the development of doctrine . . . and people to take advantage of the technology.”¹¹ It is precisely the purpose of this paper to fully examine joint doctrine in terms of the degree to which it codifies operational protection tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as examine the vital role that risk management should have in the operational protection process. While pieces of the concept of operational protection exist in joint publications, these pieces of the puzzle have yet to be interlocked and synthesized to fully define, develop, and bring into focus the operational function of protection (see Appendix A).¹²

Thesis

The lack of clear and coherent doctrine in joint publications concerning operational protection leads to a deficiency in incorporating risk management procedures for an operational commander's consideration in operational design. An operational commander's

clear understanding of what an acceptable level of risk is when determining his forces' operational protection posture significantly contributes to his ability to exercise operational art and achieve decisive results.

Scope and Methodology

Although many of the comments within this paper apply to military operations other than war (MOOTW), the focus of this paper will address operational protection as it applies to major combat operations. This study will establish the definition of operational protection, assert its importance to the combatant commander, and will offer a review of what joint doctrine currently articulates about operational protection and its symbiotic relationship with risk management. Following the review of joint doctrine, this paper will analyze other sources, such as DoD directives, in order to fill in gaps identified in joint doctrine. The paper then addresses counterarguments and concludes with recommendations.

Definition of Operational Protection

The concept of operational protection is best articulated in Dr. Milan Vego's book, *Operational Warfare*. Although not joint doctrine, he defines operational protection as:

In the broad definition, the term operational protection pertains to a series of actions and measures conducted in peacetime, crisis, and war, and designed to preserve effectiveness and survivability of one's military and nonmilitary sources of power deployed within the boundaries of a given theater.¹³

Dr. Vego goes on to say that operational protection is one of six operational functions that support the successful employment of combat forces.¹⁴ Operational protection includes both a process – assess the threat, determine friendly vulnerabilities, employ the risk management process, establish priorities for protection – and the employment of combat forces to protect against the threat. It includes the following principal components: collection of intelligence for indicators and warning (I&W); air defense; airspace control; force protection; protection of information systems; protection of logistics infrastructure; defense against weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) / nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) agents; air base ground defense and rear area defense; operations security (OPSEC) and physical security; operational deception; protection from terrorist acts; protection of U.S. citizens and other noncombatants; antisubmarine warfare; defense of the coast and coastal waters; defensive mining and mine countermeasures.¹⁵ However, this description omits the idea that risk management should play a critical role in the operational function of protection. Dr. Vego asserts that an essential element of the concept of operational protection is that, “no component of operational protection stands alone; each must be fully integrated with other elements to be fully effective.”¹⁶ With so many components of operational protection, they will not synchronize themselves; rather it will take a deliberate process to successfully employ operational protective measures in a theater. Each component of operational protection must be synchronized with the other components to achieve a synergistic effect that creates an operational advantage by the protection of the friendly center of gravity (COG); however, joint doctrine does not synchronize these components of operational protection, rather it addresses them separately.

The Importance of Operational Protection to the Combatant Commander

Operational protection is one of the foremost responsibilities of combatant commanders and commanders at all levels. For his article in *The Army Lawyer*, Major Thomas W. Murrey, Jr., USAF, conducted a comprehensive study of force protection responsibilities following the Khobar Towers bombing and concluded that, “although DOD policy is that force protection is the responsibility of anyone in a command position, the geographic CINC [combatant commander] is the only DOD figure who is given force protection responsibility by statute.”¹⁷ Only the combatant commander has the resources to

integrate all components of operational protection within a theater of operations, and is also in a position to resource and facilitate subordinates' implementation of protective measures.

A combatant commander's application of operational art should dictate the planning, synchronization and execution of all of the components of operational protection.¹⁸ Every military operation requires operational commanders and staffs to plan and implement operational protection measures to ensure the accomplishment of their objectives. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, states that Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) employ operational art to achieve decisive results in the shortest time possible and with minimal casualties.¹⁹ It follows that operational protection is critical to the JFC's planning and execution in order to minimize casualties. Operational commanders must strive to make the operational protection process more effective, including the application of risk analysis and risk mitigation as measures to gauge acceptable levels of risk and minimize casualties. It's the operational commander's willingness to apply combat power in the midst of taking defined risks, confident that mitigating factors have been established throughout the theater to sufficiently protect his COG and other priority assets, which enable him to apply the right force at the decisive time and place.

Although not joint doctrine, the Air Land Sea Application Center's manual, *Risk Management*, correctly identifies the importance of the inter-relationship between operational protection and risk management (RM) that an operational commander must apply to every major operation – "Deploying and employing the joint force generates concerns in force protection and balancing risk against resource constraints."²⁰ With limited resources, the combatant commander must prioritize what gets protected, and to what degree. Former Secretary of Defense Perry understood that not everything can receive full protection – "The

task of protecting our forces would be easy if we were willing to abandon or compromise our missions, but that is not an option.”²¹ Therefore, combatant commanders must apply RM procedures as part of synchronizing operational protection components throughout the theater.

What Joint Doctrine says about Operational Protection / Analysis of Shortfalls

Although not a publication that prescribes joint doctrine, an examination of *Joint Vision 2020* is necessary since it establishes the conceptual foundation for the development of joint doctrine. One of its four main concepts, full dimensional protection, does adequately set the foundation for the development of joint doctrine concerning operational protection.

Full dimensional protection is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. Full dimensional protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.²²

Importantly, *Joint Vision 2020* introduces the concept of associating risk management with the process of operational protection – “Commanders will thoroughly assess and manage risk as they apply protective measures to specific operations, ensuring an appropriate level of safety, compatible with other mission objectives, is provided for all assets.”²³ Lastly, it articulates the desired end state concerning full dimensional protection for the JFC as an integrated architecture for protection, which effectively manages risk to the force.²⁴ As will be demonstrated below, current joint doctrine is deficient in clearly articulating and developing the key linkage between operational protection and operational risk management. Despite this conceptual foundation, combatant commanders require joint doctrine to achieve the desired end state outlined in *JV 2020* and transform this vision into a reality.

At the top of the hierarchy of joint doctrine, JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, outlines force protection as an “enduring enabler” to the “enduring concepts,” which are guidelines that define the force posture required to accomplish missions.

The brief discussion on force protection is very vague, and offers little substantive information to a combatant commander.²⁵

Next in the hierarchy of joint doctrine is JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, which also does not adequately address operational protection. In chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” which describes strategic and operational planning, operational art, and key planning considerations, operational protection is not mentioned at all. Several components of operational protection are listed as “other planning considerations,” such as risk, deception and OPSEC; however, the description given to these planning considerations is extremely vague and does not infer their relationship to operational protection.²⁶ In chapter IV, “Joint Operations in War,” protection is listed as a consideration during three phases of joint operations. The most detailed discussion on protection occurs when outlining considerations at the outset of combat, where protection is described as having four components: protection from the enemy’s firepower and maneuver; health, welfare, morale and maintenance; safety; prevention of fratricide.²⁷ Lastly, “protection” is mentioned as a consideration when planning multinational operations, and points out that JFCs should consider, “air defense, defensive counterair, reconnaissance and surveillance, and security measures for the force . . .” as well as NBC and fratricide avoidance.²⁸ These excerpts only discuss force protection and make no reference to the fact that it is only one component of operational protection. From the scattered mention of “protection” in JP 3-0, one can deduce that protection is comprised of various elements; however, this listing is incomplete and does not articulate the concept that a combatant commander must synchronize these various components into a theater-wide operational protection plan that provides for the protection of his COG and applies risk management to the operational protection process to ensure that the right amount of forces are

applied to protection versus combat missions. In addressing the fundamentals of joint operations, JP 3-0 does state that operational art requires commanders to answer several questions, among them, “What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?”²⁹ This directs commanders to assess risk, but does not articulate the process to do so and does not link it to the concept of operational protection.

The next joint publications that will be examined are the JP 5-0 series, which discuss the doctrine for planning joint operations. As the keystone document that establishes the fundamental principals and doctrine for joint planning, JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, says surprisingly little about operational protection. Its only mention of protection or risk management is that protection is listed as a fundamental in employment and campaign planning.³⁰

Although only briefly mentioned, JP 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, is the only joint doctrinal manual that uses the term “operational protection” versus “force protection.” In a discussion of determining critical factors and identifying centers of gravity, JP 5-00.1 states that COGs must be protected and that,

In conducting an analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the combatant commander must decide how, when, where, and why his or her forces are (or might become) vulnerable to hostile actions, and then plan accordingly. This planning goes well beyond force protection. The combatant commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the main effort and providing operational protection. In providing operational protection, the combatant commander should focus attention on and assign adequate forces and assets to the most essential elements in theater to protect friendly COGs.³¹

This is the clearest articulation of the operation function of protection in joint doctrine. It incorporates the key idea of centering operational protection around the protection of the friendly COG, and correctly identifies that this operational function is more than just force protection; however, these are macro-level thoughts with no articulation on the process of implementing operational protection throughout the theater, or even defining the various

components of operational protection that a combatant commander must employ. The concept of risk management is implied in the above statement when discussing the fact that the combatant commander must balance between mission accomplishment and operational protection. This thought should be further developed and the process defined in order to assist the combatant commander in implementing operational protection.

JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, provides some guidance on force protection and risk management, but does so in a disjointed manner and does not capture the concept that protection is an operational function that must be planned in detail at the operational level. The publication acknowledges that the JFC has the responsibility for “establishing force protection policies and guidelines.”³² However, a large portion of the document describes the roles and responsibilities for staff sections of a JTF headquarters, and provides helpful checklists to guide staff officers in planning and carrying out their responsibilities, yet the reference to force protection responsibilities for any staff section is severely lacking. The J-3 and J-5 checklists make no mention of operational protection, and the J-2 checklist confines its discussion to determining if counter-intelligence has been incorporated as a force protection measure.³³ Further, the checklist on Crisis Action Planning makes no coherent reference to the operational function of protection, despite the fact that there are components of operational protection listed, such as theater missile defense, military deception, and OPSEC.³⁴ Chapter VII, “Joint Task Force Operations,” lists force protection as “another operational planning consideration,” and is the first place in joint doctrine that provides a definition of force protection. It outlines the following considerations for force protection: protection from the enemy’s maneuver and firepower; health, welfare, and morale; safety; prevention of fratricide; rules of engagement (ROE); and individual

awareness.³⁵ This list closely resembles the list of force protection considerations in JP 3-0, with the exception of ROE and individual awareness; however, these by no means encompass all the components of operational protection. Another operational planning consideration listed, but with no connection to force protection, is risk management (RM). Although the discussion is extremely short, this is the only place in joint doctrine that defines RM and the process involved.³⁶ In sum, JP 5-00.2 fails to associate force protection as a piece of the larger operational function of protection. While it does discuss some general considerations on force protection and briefly defines the risk management process, it does not assign any JTF staff section the responsibility to conduct these activities. The gaps created in joint planning doctrine by the inability to tie these thoughts on force protection and risk management with other components of operational protection may lead to seams as the operational commander, and his staff, attempt to plan and synchronize the components.

JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, addresses antiterrorism (AT) in detail and correctly identifies the relationship with force protection as, “AT is a sub-element of combating terrorism, which is one of the four pillars of a broader concept called force protection.”³⁷ Therefore, the focus of this publication is three levels below operational protection – AT is the defensive component of combating terrorism, which is a component of force protection, which is a component of operational protection. With that said, this publication does provide some insights pertinent to the operational function of protection. First, it addresses combatant commander responsibilities for AT, some of which are important to synchronizing operation protection, such as assessing the terrorist threat, prescribing AT training requirements, and incorporating host countries into AT measures.³⁸ Second, it also addresses the AT concept and program – “The AT program concept represents

an integrated, comprehensive approach within combatant commands . . . to counter the terrorist threat to installations, bases, ships, facilities, equipment, and personnel.”³⁹ This is good, and a piece of the puzzle, but what is really needed is an integrated, comprehensive approach within combatant commands to establish operational protective measures, and not just AT measures, throughout the theater, ensuring priority protection to the friendly COG while simultaneously applying the risk management process in order to take calculated risks on the protective posture of other assets. Also, many of the AT program elements described in this publication have applicability to an operational protection process.⁴⁰ Third, this publication outlines the DoD Threat Condition (THREATCON) system and procedures, now called force protection conditions (FPCONs).⁴¹ FPCONs are specifically geared toward countering terrorist threats and primarily address measures that concern bases and installations; however, they should be expanded to include all threats against the theater, not just terrorist activities, and the reactive measures should be expanded to include all components of operational protection.

Lastly, there are eleven other joint doctrinal publications that address components of operational protection.⁴² A thorough review of these documents reveals that the overriding theme is that they make no mention of how their respective topic relates to, or even supports, operational protection. These components need to be synthesized in a manual that describes their relationship to an operational protection process that enables a combatant commander to synchronize these elements, apply risk management procedures and implement an integrated protection architecture throughout the theater.

Analysis of what other Documents say about Operational Protection

Several documents outside of joint doctrinal manuals exist that also offer pieces to the puzzle of operational protection.⁴³ Though no one document fully describes the operational function of protection, they do offer some pertinent thoughts that should be incorporated into joint doctrine in order to codify the concept.

An important document that describes the symbiotic relationship between operational protection and risk management (RM) is the Air Land Sea Application Center's, *Risk Management*. Although this publication does have some applicability at the operational level of war, this publication "provides multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for tactical level [emphasis mine] risk management in the planning and execution of operations in a joint environment."⁴⁴ This manual clearly articulates the important inter-relationship between force protection and risk management:

The commander has the dilemma of weighing mission requirements and force protection measures. One of his primary tools for weighing mission and protection is reconciled in assessing and balancing risk. This process forms a direct relationship between force protection and risk management [emphasis mine]. In the force protection process, we consider three elements: planning, operations, and sustainment. Risk management enables the force protection process by using risk assessment and controls in each element.⁴⁵

A critical element of the above quote is that force protection is a process and must be thoroughly planned and supported by risk management procedures. This concept must be integrated, and further developed into joint doctrine, specifically the JP 5-0 series publications. This publication also highlights two other areas that have a direct impact on operational protection and should be incorporated into joint doctrine. First, in its discussion on the third step of the RM process – Developing Controls – the manual provides good insight into the operational controls available to a commander. Although not specifically listed as controls related to operational protection, many of the examples listed do pertain – pace of the operation, battlefield controls, rules of engagement, airspace control measures, and training.⁴⁶

This concept must be expanded in joint doctrine because it captures the idea of implementing the components of operational protection in a formalized process designed to reduce risks.

Second, *Risk Management* provides insight into a mechanism to manage and oversee operational protection planning and implementation by suggesting the establishment of a Force Protection Working Group (FPWG) to review threats, identify vulnerabilities, and recommend countermeasures.⁴⁷ Although the formation of another cell or group is always painful, the idea of forming a group, board, or cell to plan and implement operational functions is not without precedent. For example, of the doctrinal centers, boards, and cells defined in JP 5-00.2, the Joint Targeting Coordination Board oversees operational fires.⁴⁸ Further, for the first time, an Operational Protection Cell was established by the CFLCC for Operation Iraqi Freedom:

Upon assuming command of CFLCC, LTG McKiernan reorganized the staff away from traditional stovepiped staff functions and toward a staff executing integrated operational functions.... The three sub-functions – NBC defense, force protection and Theater Air and Missile Defense were combined to form operational protection and were placed under the oversight of BG Bromberg, CG, 32d AAMDC [Army Air and Missile Defense Command]. The CFLCC staff formed a Command Operational Protection Cell (COP-C).⁴⁹

Ironically, the recommended composition for a FPWG outlined in *Risk Management* excluded both an air defense representative and a military police representative, while the Commander, CFLCC (COMCFLCC) designated the senior air defense commander in theater to lead the COP-C. Its core membership was a combination of military police, NBC, and air defense, supplemented by representatives from the CFLCC C-2, C-3 and C-7. Key tasks performed by the COP-C were vulnerability assessments of the CFLCC area of responsibility, information briefs to the COMCFLCC on the risk to High Value Assets (HVAs) within the AOR, and recommendations on the allocation of combat power to protect HVAs.⁵⁰ The COP-C proved successful in synchronizing operational protection issues within CFLCC.⁵¹ While these efforts are excellent at the component level, the combatant commander must also apply the same rigor

and techniques at his level to establish theater-wide operational protection to ensure that seams do not exist between the CFLCC and CFMCC, for example.

The *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* serves as a common language and reference system for JFCs to derive training requirements.⁵² Although the *UJTL* is geared to be a training reference versus a doctrinal manual, it's structured in a manner that could provide the foundation for the development of joint doctrine on the operational function of protection. To begin with, the *UJTL* aligns tasks into operational functions.⁵³ It is also the only document produced by the joint staff to provide a definition of operational force protection.⁵⁴ This definition focuses on protecting the force's combat power for the decisive time and place, and connotes a broader range of influence than the definitions of force protection outlined above. Additionally, a review of the supporting tasks listed under operational force protection in the *UJTL* reveals a similar listing of tasks and actions outlined in Dr. Vego's *Operational Warfare*; however, there are three significant shortfalls.⁵⁵ First, the *UJTL* does not list "collection of intelligence for indications and warnings" as part of operational protection. This is a critical deficiency because the threat assessment feeds an assessment of vulnerabilities, which are vital in the planning of operational protection. Second, the *UJTL* does not list combating terrorism as a supporting task for operational protection. This is a glaring shortfall. Antiterrorism is an integral component of operational protection, especially in today's environment where it is one of the biggest threats to the protection of forces and bases in the Joint Rear Area. Third, the *UJTL* does not indicate the inter-relationship between operational protection and risk management. Yet, despite these shortfalls, the *UJTL* would serve as a good start point for the development of joint doctrine on operational protection in terms of definitions and groupings of tasks.

The last documents to be examined are DoD Directive 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*, and DoD Instruction 2000.16, *DoD Antiterrorism Standards*. Antiterrorism is only one piece of force protection, which is only one piece of operational protection; however, there are some important lessons in these documents that can be applied to the development of joint doctrine for operational protection. As the document that defines the DoD AT program, DoD Directive 2000.12 defines antiterrorism responsibilities for many agencies, but in particular, for the geographic combatant commanders.⁵⁶ These responsibilities should be expanded to encompass the entire operational function of protection and codified in joint doctrine.

DoD Instruction 2000.16 lists standards for combatant commanders to adhere to when implementing antiterrorism programs. Pertinent to this paper is the codification of the elements of an AT Plan --terrorism threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, AT physical security measures, terrorist incident response measures, and terrorist consequence management measures.⁵⁷ Building on the analysis and recommendations above concerning the implementation of an Operational Protection Cell to manage and synchronize the planning process, employ risk management procedures within the operational protection process, and recommend employment of the components of operational protection listed in the *UJTL* and outlined by Dr. Vego, the elements of the AT Plan should be expanded beyond just an AT focus and incorporated into joint doctrine to form the foundation for an operational protection process. Using this methodology, a proposed operational protection process is depicted below, which enables the operational commander to employ the components of operational protection to specific High Value Assets within a formalized process that ensures he has a clear understanding of what risks he is accepting across the theater (see Appendix B).




Figure 1 – Proposed Operational Protection Process

Counterarguments

There are two major counterarguments that may arise against the assertion that the lack of clear and coherent doctrine in joint publications concerning operational protection leads to a deficiency in incorporating risk management procedures for an operational commander's consideration in operational design. The first counterargument is that joint doctrine addresses the operational function of protection sufficiently, to include its inter-relationship with risk management. In fact, some have argued that, "application of the tenets of operational art provide the campaign planner the greatest means of protecting the force at the strategic and operational levels."⁵⁸ The premise of this argument is that nine of the sixteen tenets of operational art directly relate to force protection, and these should be sufficient guides towards

implementing operational protection throughout the theater.⁵⁹ While these tenets may have applicability to operational protection, they also have applicability to several other operational functions. Because operational art translates the JFC's strategy into operational design, it must be supported with joint doctrine to outline the process. With multiple operational functions to synchronize, the combatant commander and his staff require the codification of thoughtful guidelines on how to plan and execute operational protection. As outlined above in the analysis of joint doctrine, there is currently no one doctrinal manual that describes the operational function of protection and the process for planning and synchronizing the various components of operational protection throughout a theater. As several researchers on operational protection have concluded, "the foundation for the DOD force protection program is a scattered mishmash of messages, agreements, statutes and regulations."⁶⁰ In order to prevent gaps or seams in the theater's operational protection plan, the pieces of the operational protection puzzle must be put together in one joint doctrinal document. Sole reliance on a commander's application of operational art without a doctrinal foundation is not a recipe for success. In sum, upon analyzing the need to further develop the operational function of protection, "[w]hat becomes clear is that FP [force protection] is more than security, and the process to accomplish the task successfully requires proactive, deliberate action. It is a process that entails planning for the application of military assets to minimize the effects of hazards and hostile activities that can impair friendly force effectiveness."⁶¹

The second counterargument is that there is too much attention on force protection and it has become prioritized above the operational objective. In his 2001 article for *Military Review*, LTC Richard R. Caniglia, U.S. Army, examined force protection procedures in Bosnia and asserted that:

The inevitable rise of institutional structures produces staff officers with checklists, risk-assessment methodologies and force-protection paragraphs in orders. Force protection rises to the status of a mission from its traditional role as a responsibility. Institutionalizing force protection has become a cottage industry in the US military: it now consumes resources and affects events.⁶²

As this author points out, force protection is not only a responsibility, but it's also a mission. A mission, commonly defined as a task and purpose, is an appropriate term to use for operational protection. As discussed above, the *UJTL* establishes the task of operational force protection. So to imply that force protection should not be a mission is inaccurate. Everyone acknowledges that, "the mission will always need to be accomplished and will always represent the overriding purpose. . . . At the same time the force must be protected."⁶³ And in order for the mission to be accomplished, it requires the protection of the friendly COG. It is precisely the doctrine, checklists and risk assessment methodologies ridiculed above that enable the combatant commander to determine the level of risk he is willing to accept, and synchronize the various components of operational protection that will enable him to apply decisive combat power at the right place and time.

Recommendations

First, joint doctrine needs to be consolidated and defined in a coherent manner that articulates the operational function of protection. That doctrine should be codified in a JP 3-X series manual. As outlined in Appendix A, currently the pieces of the operational protection puzzle are scattered through multiple joint doctrinal manuals, and even if combined, the pieces would not form a complete picture. Several documents that will be essential to incorporate into joint doctrine on the operational function of protection are Air Land Sea Application Center's, *Risk Management*, the *UJTL*, DoD Directive 2000.12, and DoD Instruction 2000.16.

Second, risk management must be identified in joint doctrine as an essential element of operational protection. The linkage between operational protection and risk management is

crucial, yet not well articulated in current joint doctrine. Air Land Sea Application Center's, *Risk Management* should be re-worked as an operational-level document and incorporated into joint doctrine as part of the operational protection function. Additionally, step three of the risk management process, develop controls, should outline the operational protective measures that the combatant commander can influence.

Third, the Operational Protection Cell should be incorporated into joint doctrine in JP 5-00.2, chapter VII, paragraph 4, "Centers, Boards, and Cells." As discussed above, the value added at the component level at CFLCC during OIF was significant. The ability of the CFLCC operational protection cell to synchronize operational protection activities in the planning, deployment and execution phases produced a synergistic affect that preserved the CFLCC's COG (V Corps) despite various Iraqi attacks. While successful at the CFLCC level, this cell also needs to be implemented at the combatant commander level in order to ensure that adversaries, as discussed in the introduction, do not exploit the potential seams between component commands.

Fourth, an operational protection process that includes risk management procedures must be defined and integrated into the joint planning process. One of the documented lessons learned from OIF was that, "Operational protection must be included throughout the planning process."⁶⁴ A process for synchronizing operational protection, such as the one proposed in Appendix B, must be defined for operational commanders and incorporated into the JP 5-0 series publications and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

Conclusion

This paper has outlined the definition of operational protection, articulated its importance to the combatant commander, analyzed what joint doctrine and other publications

say about operational protection, and recommended actions to correct deficiencies. In his article in the *Marine Corps Gazette* concerning force protection, Major Daniel J. Shuster, USMC, correctly points out that alone, individual and unsynchronized protective measures will not prevent seams in a theater's protective posture from being exploited:

Individual protective measures, hostage awareness, and physical security technologies will all serve to better safe guard the lives of individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. Alone however, these measures will not prevent another bombing in Beirut or Saudi Arabia, or ambush of forces in Mogadishu.⁶⁵

Individual and tactical force protection actions, even if executed superbly, are not enough to ensure adequate protection in a theater of operation. With so many components of operational protection, they will not synchronize themselves. Rather it will take a deliberate process to successfully employ operational protective measures and associated risk management procedures in a theater.

To achieve the vision of full dimensional protection, from which operational protection is the realization of this concept at the operational level of war, U.S. joint doctrine must define and outline the operational protection process to achieve an integrated theater architecture, as well as articulate to combatant commanders the tactics, techniques and procedures to synchronize the multiple components of operational protection to ensure the protection of the friendly COG and other priority assets. The operational protection process recommended in this paper will accomplish these goals by formalizing risk management into the application of the operational protection process, thereby ensuring an operational commander's clear understanding of what an acceptable level of risk is when establishing the theater's integrated architecture for protection.


APPENDIX A -- JOINT DOCTRINAL REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL PROTECTION

	OUTLINES A JOINT PROCESS FOR OPERATIONAL PROTECTION THAT INCORPORATES ALL COMPONENTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT	DEFINES OPERATIONAL PROTECTION, TO INCLUDE INCORPORATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF COG	DEFINES OPERATIONAL PROTECTION IN DETAIL & OUTLINES INTER RELATIONSHIP WITH RISK	DISCUSSES FORCE PROTECTION IN DETAIL	DEFINES FORCE PROTECTION	MENTIONS FORCE PROTECTION	OUTLINES A JOINT DOCTRINAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS FOR JFCs	DISCUSSES RISK AS AN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION (BUT NOT RELATED TO FORCE PROTECTION)	DISCUSSES A SUPPORTING COMPONENT OF OPERATIONAL PROTECTION	REMARKS
<i>Joint Vision 2020</i>		X Does NOT define Operational Protection, but does define a higher conceptual Dimensional Protection, from which Joint Doctrine should expound on.								Establishes the conceptual foundation of "Full Dimensional Protection" that Joint Doctrine should build upon. Introduce the concept of associating risk assessment and management with the process of operational protection. Articulates a desired end state for the JFC concerning full dimensional protection for the joint force commander -- an integrated architecture for protection, which will effectively manage risk to the joint force and other assets.
<i>JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States</i>						X				Outlines force protection as an "enduring enabler" to the "enduring concepts", which are guidelines that define the force posture required to accomplish missions. The discussion on force protection is very vague, and offers little useful information to a combatant commander. Completely lacking in its discussion on force protection is the concept of protecting one's center of gravity or conducting a vulnerability and risk assessment.
<i>JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary for Military Terms</i>					X					The DoD Dictionary for Military Terms defines "Force Protection," but does NOT provide a definition for "Operational Protection." While a key component, force protection is just one element of operational protection. The definition given for force protection does not encompass the scope and breadth of activity that operational protection entails. Key elements that are lacking is the concept of protecting the friendly COG, synchronization with the other elements of operational protection, and the inter-relationship with risk management.
<i>JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations</i>						X		X		Protection is listed as a consideration in joint operations and is described as having four components: protection from the enemy's firepower and maneuver; health, welfare, morale and maintenance; safety; prevention of fratricide. Only mention of risk is the question, "What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?"
<i>JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</i>						X				Says surprisingly little. ONLY mention of protection is in Campaign planning section -- Identify friendly COG and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting it.
<i>JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning</i>			X Does not actually define operational protection, but is the only JP to use the term "operational protection" vs. "force protection"							The clearest articulation of the operation function of operational protection in joint doctrine. It incorporates the key idea of centering operational protection around the protection of the friendly COG and correctly identifies that this operational function is more than just force protection; however, these are macro-level thoughts with no articulation on the process of implementing operational protection throughout the theater, or even defining the various components of operational protection that a combatant commander should employ.

	OUTLINES A JOINT PROCESS FOR OPERATIONAL PROTECTION THAT INCORPORATES ALL COMPONENTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT	DEFINES OPERATIONAL PROTECTION, TO INCLUDE INCORPORATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF COG	DEFINES OPERATIONAL PROTECTION	OUTLINES INTER DETAIL & RELATIONSHIP WITH RISK	DISCUSSES FORCE PROTECTION IN DETAIL	DEFINES FORCE PROTECTION	MENTIONS FORCE PROTECTION	OUTLINES A JOINT DOCTRINAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS FOR JFCs	DISCUSSES RISK AS AN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION (BUT NOT RELATED TO FORCE PROTECTION)	DISCUSSES A SUPPORTING COMPONENT OF OPERATIONAL PROTECTION	REMARKS
JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures						X					Does not incorporate Force Protection into any Staff Planning Checklist. Does not assign any staff element responsibility for planning FP. DOES outline a RM process, but is very vague and its not in relation to force protection.
JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism										X	Provides three good thoughts that could be transferred to operational protection: establishes combatant commander responsibilities; outlines the process of an anti-terrorism program; establishes Force Protection Conditions (FPCONS).
Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)			X								NOT a joint doctrinal manual. DOES define Operational Protection, but overlooks three KEY components: collection of intel for Indications & Warnings; combating terrorism / anti-terrorism; risk management.
Dr. Milan Vego, Operational Warfare			X								BUT, is NOT joint doctrine. Defines Operational Protection as one of seven operational functions, but does not incorporate Risk Management as a component, or related to, Operational Protection. Also does not address an Operational Protection process that the Combatant Commander can implement and incorporate into planning to ensure theater-wide protection.
DoD Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program										X	Outlines combatant commander responsibilities for anti-terrorism -- could be expanded into CC responsibilities for operational protection.
DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards										X	Codifies elements of an AT Plan --terrorism threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, antiterrorism physical security measures, terrorist incident response measures, and terrorist consequence management measures. These could be expanded on to create an operational protection plan / process. AT Plan elements make a great foundation for an Operational Protection Process.
ALSA, Risk Management				X							1. Outlines the symbiotic relationship between Protection and Risk Management. 2. Addresses the importance of incorporating FP & RM into planning process. 3. Introduces concept of a Force Protection Working Group. KEY: FPWG can provide the foundation for an Operational Protection Cell.

	OUTLINES A JOINT PROCESS FOR OPERATIONAL PROTECTION THAT INCORPORATES ALL COMPONENTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT	DEFINES OPERATIONAL PROTECTION, TO INCLUDE INCORPORATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF COG	DEFINES OPERATIONAL PROTECTION	DISCUSSES FORCE PROTECTION IN DETAIL & OUTLINES INTER RELATIONSHIP WITH RISK	DISCUSSES FORCE PROTECTION IN DETAIL	DEFINES FORCE PROTECTION	MENTIONS FORCE PROTECTION	OUTLINES A JOINT DOCTRINAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS FOR JFCs	DISCUSSES RISK AS AN OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION (BUT NOT RELATED TO FORCE PROTECTION)	DISCUSSES A SUPPORTING COMPONENT OF OPERATIONAL PROTECTION	REMARKS
DOCUMENTS DISCUSSING COMPONENTS OF OPERATIONAL PROTECTION											
JP 2-0, <i>Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 2-01.3, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-01, <i>Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-01.5, <i>Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-10, <i>Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations</i>							X			X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-10.1, <i>Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense</i>							X			X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-11, <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations in NBC Environments</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-30, <i>Command & Control for Joint Air Operations</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-52, <i>Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-54, <i>Joint Doctrine for Operations Security</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.
JP 3-58, <i>Joint Doctrine for Military Deception</i>										X	Document does not discuss how this component of operational protection relates / contributes to the process of establishing an integrated, theater protection architecture.

APPENDIX B – PROPOSED OPERATIONAL PROTECTION PROCESS



The proposed Operational Protection Process (OPP) is a synthesis of several thoughts within, and outside of, joint doctrine. In the actual process, the six steps outlined in the top block – threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, establish protective measures, incident response measures, and consequence management measures – are primarily derived from DoD Instruction 2000.16, *DoD Antiterrorism Standards*. However, the steps outlined in the OPP cover a much broader range of activities than those for just antiterrorism. The thoughts on risk management, step three of the process, are largely derived from Air Land Sea Application Center's, *Risk Management*, and should be codified into the operational protection process, as well as into joint doctrine. The Operational Protection Cell (OPC) concept, depicted in the middle section of the diagram, is also taken from *Risk Management* and has been modified based on the real world experiences of the first-ever implementation of an OPC by the CFLCC in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The components of operational protection, the bottom block of the diagram, are derived from two sources – the *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* and Dr. Vego's, *Operational Warfare*.

Key thoughts concerning the Operational Protection Process:

- In support of the thesis of this study, the proposed Operational Protection Process would codify a joint doctrinal process that sufficiently formalizes risk management into the application of the operational protection process, thereby ensuring an operational commander's clear understanding of what an acceptable level of risk is when determining his forces' operational protection posture (see Risk Management steps above: developing controls mitigates the risk by employing measures and forces to counter the threats, and by "establishing priorities for High Value Assets," the operational commander effectively makes risk decisions).
- Protection of the friendly COG is an essential element / outcome of the process.
- The Operational Protection Cell (OPC) is the core of the proposed Operational Protection Process. The OPC is responsible for integrating the process, shown in the top block, with the components of operational protection, outlined in the bottom block, throughout all phases of the operation – planning, preparation, and execution. The OPC acts as the controlling mechanism between the process and the employment of the components (controls, tasks, or forces) and should continually report to the operational commander. By synchronizing the process and the components, the OPC will be able to achieve synergistic effects in the protective posture of the theater.
- Step 1: the threat assessment completed in step 1 of the process will feed the "Identify Hazards" and "Assess Hazards" steps of the risk management process, which is step three of the Operational Protection Process.
- Step 2: the vulnerability assessment must identify seams that an adversary could exploit and will lead to a High Value Asset (HVA) list, which are those assets within the theater of operations that are of importance for the successful accomplishment of the mission. Many of the HVAs will be derived from the friendly critical strength assessment completed during the operational design. To use a parallel, the HVA list is very similar to the Critical Asset List (CAL) that the JFACC develops – this list determines those assets within theater that are important to the operation and may warrant air and missile defense protection. At this step in the process, this list is not prioritized; rather it is simply a comprehensive listing of those HVAs that exist within the theater.
- Step 3: application of the risk management process occurs during this step. Critical to the overall operational protection process is step three of the risk management process – develop controls and make risk decisions. When developing controls, the Operational Protection Cell draws from the various components of operational protection, outlined in the bottom block of the diagram. These components, or controls, are tools and tasks that the operational commander has at his disposal to employ and implement within the theater. The implementation of these components will enhance protection of HVAs, thereby mitigating risk to the overall operation. The second part of this step, making risk decisions, takes into account the guidance that the operational commander has established on how much risk he is willing to accept. Also, when making risk decisions, the OPC must determine the recommended HVA priority list for the commander's approval. By prioritizing the HVA list, the commander can

determine exactly where he is taking risks because there are never enough protection assets for everything, and the operational commander must balance protecting the force with applying sufficient combat power to accomplish the mission. For the methodology of prioritizing the HVA list, the application of the Air and Missile Defense community's Defended Asset List (DAL) process is recommended. In this process, a matrix is developed by listing the HVAs on the vertical axis, and assessing them against four criteria (placed on the horizontal axis of the matrix) – criticality, vulnerability, recuperability, and threat. Criticality is the assessment of how critical the asset is to the accomplishment of the mission. For example, the friendly COG would be the most critical HVA. Vulnerability is an assessment of how easy it would be to attack an asset. Some assets within the theater are “softer” targets than others, meaning that they are organically not as well protected. Recuperability is an assessment of, if the target was attacked and damaged, how easy would it be to reconstitute the functions and capabilities of that asset. The assessment of threat deals with determining those targets the enemy is most likely to target. By assigning numeric values and establishing a scale, each HVA can be assessed against the four criteria described above. The matrix will result in a numeric prioritization of the HVAs, which the OPC can further refine and present it to the commander for approval. This process will enable the OPC to make thoughtful and calculated recommendations on which assets receive how much protection.

- Step 4: step four of the risk management process (implement controls) flows into step four of the operational protection process (establish protective measures). The first three steps of the OPP are conducted during the “planning” phase of the operation, but this step of establishing protective measures marks the beginning of the preparation phase of the operation and entails the physical employment of the components of operational protection to HVAs. At the conclusion of this step in the process, the operational commander has approved the prioritized HVA list and approved the recommended employment of operational protection components to specific HVAs. Also, the operational commander has a clear understanding of what risks he is accepting across the theater. The implementation of protective measures not only includes the physical employment of those operational protection components available, but also includes those passive defense measures that the operational commander disseminates as guidance. Step four of the operational protection process is complete when the prioritized and integrated protection architecture is established within the theater of operations, and the protection of the friendly COG is established.
- Steps 5 and 6: incident response measures and consequence management measures occur during the execution phase of the operation, once an incident has occurred. While an essential part of the operational protection process, these areas fall outside the scope of this study.

NOTES

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¹ Jonathan Finer, "One U.S. Worker Shot Dead, Another Wounded in Kuwait," *The Washington Post*, 22 January 2003, sec. A, p. 01.

² Michael R. Gordon, "A Nation at War: Military Analysis; A swift, and Risky, Attack by Land, With Surprise in Mind," *New York Times*, 21 March 2003, sec. B, p. 01.

³ Bradley Graham, "Radar Probed in Patriot Incidents: False Signals May Have Led to Downings," *Washington Post*, 08 May 2003, sec. A, p. 21.

⁴ Almost all Joint and Service doctrinal manuals and publications discuss protection in terms of "force protection." However, force protection is only one element within the operational function of "operational protection." The focus of this paper is on operational protection – those functions that the combatant commander can influence and implement to provide for the protection of all U.S personnel, facilities and equipment in his area of responsibility, and especially his identified Center of Gravity (COG). Therefore, given that so many documents only use the term force protection, the reader must understand that the use of the term "force protection" should be taken in context of its relationship to operational protection.

⁵ There are two recent and ongoing efforts within the Department of Defense that are attempting to address the current deficiencies in operational protection.

The first effort is by the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff recently announced its intent to form Functional Capability Boards (FCBs) to examine the existing shortfalls within operational protection and report them to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. “New instructions establishing the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) managed by the Pentagon will allow functional capabilities boards (FCBs) to help the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) determine where shortfalls exist in current capabilities in several areas and generate new requirements....” One of the FCBs is “force protection,” with a desired end state of identifying shortfalls and establishing an integrated architecture for this operational function. While this is movement in the right direction, progress will be slow and the end state will not necessarily result in the publication of joint doctrine for operational protection. Source: Lorenzo Cortes, “Functional Capabilities Boards to Assist JROC in Assessing Requirements,” *Defense Daily*, 23 July 2003, 1.

The second effort, by the Department of Defense, is a draft document entitled, “Joint Operations Concepts.” This document is currently still being reviewed and prepared for the signature of the Secretary of Defense. In its draft form, the document outlines a set of joint operating concepts – Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, Homeland Security (HLS), and Strategic Deterrence – that describe how the future force will operate within the range of military operations. It further outlines five joint functional concepts, one of which is “protection,” that describe the desired capabilities of the future force. In its draft form, the document does not expand on the details of what capabilities a force would require for protection; however, work is being done to develop the details of the concept. Again, thought is being applied to the concept of operational protection; however, these concepts, when complete, must be translated and codified in joint doctrine.

⁶ William J. Perry, “Force Protection: Hardening the Target,” *Defense*, no. 6 (1996): 3.

⁷ The “Downing Commission” was chartered by former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to assess the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996, and to make recommendations on how to prevent incidents like this from happening again. To lead the committee, the Secretary of Defense appointed General (retired) Wayne A. Downing, a former combatant commander. The Downing Commission delivered a final report to the Secretary of Defense on 30 August 1996. Its major findings include: issue Department of Defense-wide standards for providing force protection; give local commanders operational control with regard to force protection matters; designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal adviser and the single DoD-wide focal point for force protection activities; move force protection responsibilities from the Department of State to the Department of Defense where possible; improve intelligence collection capabilities; establish a workable division of force protection responsibilities with host nations; and raise funding priority for force protection. Of particular interest to this study is that two of the recommendations listed above – issue DoD-wide standards for providing force protection, and designate the CJCS as the DoD-wide focal point for force protection – should have prompted the Joint Staff to develop joint doctrine concerning force / operational protection. An analysis of joint doctrine reveals that this has not happened.

⁸ Bryan Bender, “Shali Calls for Preeminence in Force Protection,” *Defense Daily* 196, no. 23 (01 August 1997): 1.

In calling on the U.S. military to make force protection a top priority, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili publicly challenged commanders and staff elements to, “make the United States, as quickly as possible, the preeminent force in force protection.”

⁹ Joint doctrine and other publications often refer to “force protection.” However, this is just one component of operational protection. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines force protection:

“Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.” [Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of*

¹⁰ While technology will continue to enhance operational protection, the combatant commander's focus is on the process of ensuring operational protection throughout the theater, not the specific technologies.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, DC: June 2000), 3.

JV 2020 correctly asserts that technological advances are very useful and necessary; however, of greater importance is the development of doctrine that a combatant commander can use to help him establish the theater's operational protection architecture – "Attaining that goal [of full dimensional protection as envisioned in *Joint Vision 2020*] requires the steady infusion of new technology and modernization and replacement of equipment. However, material superiority alone is not sufficient. Of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology."

¹² Defense Adaptive Red Team, "DART Review of Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Functional Concepts: Findings from the Concept Review Workshop 30 September – 2 October 2003," (Arlington, VA: 13 October 2003), 173.

In fact, the Defense Adaptive Red Team, a contracting firm working for the Joint Staff recently concluded that, "[c]urrently the protection mission area does not capitalize on the advantages of a fully integrated system of functions that provides the synergy that provides the joint force with seamless protection." Therefore, the elements of operational protection that are strewn throughout various joint publications need to be synthesized into coherent guidance for the operational commander.

¹³ Milan Vego, *Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2000), 277.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 185.

"Successful employment of combat forces across the operational continuum requires the existence and effective organization of functions in support of the employment of combat forces.... Some functions are essentially processes, while others include both processes and the employment of combat forces."

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 277-278.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 278.

¹⁷ Thomas W. Murrey Jr., "Khobar Towers' Progeny: The Development of Force Protection," *The Army Lawyer*, October 1999, 2.

The statutory authority giving combatant commanders legal responsibility to provide force protection for the forces within their area of responsibility comes from The Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 and Title 10 of the United States Code. Although the Secretary of Defense remains responsible for personnel overseas, the combatant commander is responsible for the success or failure of the force protection program. A further clarification that the combatant commander is responsible for antiterrorism and force protection programs is outlined in Department of Defense Directive 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism Plan*, 18 August 2003, as well as in the President of the United States' *Unified Command Plan*, dated, 30 April 2002 – "The commander of a combatant command is responsible for: . . . Maintaining the security of and carrying out force protection responsibilities for the command, including assigned or attached commands, forces, and assets." (p. 03)

¹⁸ Vego, *Operational Warfare*, 185.

Dr. Vego emphasizes the importance of integrating the operational functions into planning -- "The operational commander applies operational art to the planning and execution of a campaign or major operation, not only by sequencing and synchronizing joint forces in combat but also by sequencing and synchronizing many operational-level activities [functions]."

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: 1 February 1995), II-1.

²⁰ Air Land Sea Application Center, *Risk Management: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Langley Air Force Base, VA: February, 2001), I-1.

²¹ Perry, "Force Protection: Hardening the Target," 10.

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, 26.

²³ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

"The joint force commander will thereby be provided an integrated architecture for protection, which will effectively manage risk to the joint force and other assets, and leverage the contributions of all echelons of our forces.... The result will be improved freedom of action for friendly forces and better protection at all echelons."

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: 14 November 2000), IV-11.

The very brief mention of protection in JP 1 is very broad and offers little substantive information to a combatant commander that is trying to establish an operational protection architecture in his theater of operations – "Protection should include military capabilities and functions such as information, intelligence, logistics and others that are essential for mission accomplishment." This broad listing of capabilities and functions is grossly inadequate. As outlined above in the main body of this paper, the operational function of protection consists of many elements. These elements must be clearly defined in joint doctrine. Lacking from its discussion on protection is the concept of protecting one's COG or conducting vulnerability or risk assessments.

²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: 1 February 1995), III-28.

In the discussion of these planning considerations, the statements are extremely vague. For example, when discussing risk, JP 3-0 states, "Commanders consider many factors as they identify risk in combat or potential combat situations." This statement offers little substantive value to a combatant commander that is trying to establish an operational protection architecture for a theater of operations. Further, despite mentioning "risk" as another planning factor, JP 3-0 does not mention or establish the relationship between risk management and operational protection.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, IV-6, 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, VI-12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, II-3.

³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: 13 April 1995), II-20.

JP 5-0 only mentions protection in one area. Its guidance is very broad and of little substantive value to a combatant commander -- "Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them." Its only key thought is that the COG should be protected; however, it does not articulate the combatant commander is overall responsible for establishing and resourcing the operational protective measure to ensure the COG's protection. Further, JP 5-0 does not articulate that there are many components of operational protection, to include the incorporation of the risk management process, which must be synchronized in order to achieve protection of the COG.

³¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Publication 5-00.1 (Washington, DC: 25 January 2002), II-10-11.

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, Joint Publication 5-00.2 (Washington, DC: 13 January 1999), II-8.

Despite the fact that JP 5-00.2 acknowledges the JFC's responsibility to establish force protection guidelines and policies in the theater of operations, the supporting sentences under this responsibility mainly talk about counter-intelligence (CI) as the inherent part of this responsibility. Counter intelligence is only a very small fraction of the operational commander's responsibilities. The document needs to address the operational commander's responsibility to establish an operational protection architecture with the theater that synchronizes the various supporting components, including the integration of risk management as part of the operational protection process.

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, Joint Publication 5-00.2 (Washington, DC: 13 January 1999), VI-19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, IX-30-39.

³⁵ The definition of "force protection" listed in JP 5-00.2 has been superceded by the current definition as listed in JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. It is important to note that the elements of force protection listed in JP 5-00.2 closely resemble, but are different, that those listed in JP 3-0. Joint doctrine needs to standardize elements associated with force protection; however, more importantly, joint doctrine needs to define the concept of operational protection and identify force protection as one of its components.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, VII-23.

"Risk management (RM) is a process which assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk. The RM process provides leaders with a systematic mechanism to aid in identifying and choosing the optimum COA based upon risk for any given situation. RM should be an element of planning and executing an operation." It also lists the five-step risk management – identify hazards, assess hazards, develop controls and make decisions, implement controls, and supervise and evaluate.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, Joint Publication 3-07.2 (Washington, DC: 17 March 1998), I-2.

The four pillars of force protection mentioned in JP 3-07.2 refer to a superceded definition of force protection, which identified combating terrorism, physical security, OPSEC, and personal protective measures as the components of force protection. The new definition in JP 1-02 is more general and does not mention key components of force protection.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, I-8-9.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, IV-2.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, IV-1-2.

These antiterrorism program elements that have applicability to operational protection include: threat analysis, friendly criticality and vulnerability assessments, a threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerabilities, OPSEC, employment of measures to contain threats, and training.

⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, 208.

Since the writing of JP 3-07.2, the term THREATCON has been superceded in JP 1-02 and replaced with force protection condition (FPCON), "[a] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program standardizing the Military Services' identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities." The FPCONs outline four conditions, based on the threat, and provide suggested security measures to counter the terrorist threat.

⁴² The following eleven joint publications address components of operational protection, as defined in Dr. Milan Vego's, *Operational Warfare*: JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*; JP 2-01.3, *Joint*

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB); JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*; JP 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense*; JP 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*; JP 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense*; JP 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*; JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*; JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*; JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*; JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*.

⁴³ General Accounting Office, *Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DoD Deployments through Domestic Seaports*, Report Number GAO-03-15 to the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: 22 October 2002), 2-3.

An important document that contributes to the professional discussion on operational protection and has applicability for combatant commanders is the recent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report listed above. In this report, the (GAO) conducted an evaluation of the force protection posture of U.S. seaports used to deploy military forces. Although only a small piece of the operational protection function, their findings about weaknesses in threat analysis, information dissemination and the gaps in DoD's oversight and control over force protection have applicability to combatant commanders.

Further, on pages 1-2, the GAO report acknowledges the inseparable relationship between operational protection and risk management – "Military commanders are responsible for the protection of personnel, equipment, and other assets. To achieve this objective, commanders apply a "risk management" approach, which is a systematic, analytical process to determine the likelihood that a threat will negatively impact physical assets, individuals, or operations and identify actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. The principles of risk management acknowledge that although risk generally cannot be eliminated, it can be significantly reduced by enhancing protection from known or potential threats."

⁴⁴ Air Land Sea Application Center, *Risk Management: Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, I-1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, I-5.

Page I-2 also establishes the inter-relationship between operational protection and risk management by stating that one of the key aspects of risk management is, "[p]reserving and protecting personnel, combat weapons systems and support equipment while avoiding unnecessary risk."

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, II-4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, B-1.

"The purpose of the force protection working group (FPWG) is to review threats, identify vulnerabilities, recommend countermeasures, determine force protection levels, assess in place measures, review tasks to components, monitor corrective actions, and direct special studies (force protection assessment teams). The primary responsibility is to monitor and assess the risk and threats to forces in the joint operations area and implement risk controls to maintain protection of the force."

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, Joint Publication 5-00.2, VII-5.

⁴⁹ 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Theater Air and Missile Defense History*, (Fort Bliss, TX: September 2003), 104.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ix.

As an example of the success of CFLCC's Operational Protection Cell, vulnerabilities that were assessed to be "red" [severely deficient] were given additional resources from CFLCC in order to enhance their protective posture, and "[t]he COMCFLCC routinely commented on the operational protection briefing slides in regards to reducing the risk associated with the HVAs in theater."

⁵² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 3500.04C (Washington, DC: 1 July 2002), A-1.

⁵³ Ibid., B-A-3.

The *UJTL* describes tasks in terms of the following operational functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, firepower, logistics and personnel support, command and control, and force protection. Importantly, it is the only Joint Staff document that aligns tasks into operational functions.

⁵⁴ Ibid., B-C-C-130.

The *UJTL* defines operational protection: “To conserve the force’s fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. This activity includes actions taken to counter the enemy’s forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.), systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This task includes protecting joint and multinational air, space, land, sea, and special operations forces; bases; A/SPODs and essential personnel; and LOCs from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated enemy air, space, ground, and sea attack; chemical and biological warfare; and terrorist attack. This task also pertains to protection of operational level forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war. This capability applies domestically in Homeland Security as well as OCONUS operations.”

⁵⁵ Ibid., D-43, 44.

A review of the supporting tasks to Operational Force Protection on these pages reveals three significant shortfalls. First the *UJTL* does not list “collection of intelligence for indications and warnings” as part of operational protection. Second, the *UJTL* does not list combating terrorism as a supporting task for operational protection. Third, the *UJTL* does not indicate the inter-relationship between operational protection and risk management.

⁵⁶ Department of Defense, *DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Plan*, Department of Defense Directive 2000.12 (Washington, DC: 18 August 2003), 17-19.

⁵⁷ Department of Defense, *DoD Antiterrorism Standards*, DoD Instruction 2000.16 (Washington, DC: 14 June 2001), 16.

⁵⁸ James H. Moller, “Force Protection and Command Relationships: Who’s Responsible?” (Unpublished Research Paper, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 16 December 1998), 37.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 6-8.

The author asserts that nine of the 16 tenets of operational art have application to operational protection – synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, balance, timing and tempo, operational reach, forces and functions, arranging operations, and culmination – and that these should be sufficient in guiding an operational commander in his development of an integrated protection architecture throughout the theater of operations.

⁶⁰ Murrey, “Khobar Towers’ Progeny: The Development of Force Protection,” 18.

⁶¹ Daniel Ward, “Assessing Force Protection Risk,” *Military Review* 77, no. 6 (November – December 1997): 11-12.

⁶² Richard R. Caniglia, “Leadership: US and British Approaches to Force Protection,” *Military Review* 81, no. 4 (July – August 2001): 78.

⁶³ James M. Milano and Christopher A. Mitchell, “Force Protection: A State of Mind,” *Military Review* 80, no. 6 (November – December 2000): 44.

⁶⁴ 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Theater Air and Missile Defense History*, 108.

⁶⁵ Daniel J. Shuster, “Bricks Without Mortar: Force Protection and Staff Responsibilities,” *Marine Corps Gazette* 81, no. 12 (December 1997): 60.